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Abstract
Recent litigation by the California Attorney General has sparked
renewed interest in the role of environmental justice under federal and state
project environmental review laws. Some say that inserting environmental
justice into environmental review marks a “radical expansion” of the role of
social justice in environmental review. Environmental justice is now a wellestablished federal legal doctrine addressing communities disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards as a result of their social or
economic demographics. The doctrine is supported by President Clinton’s
executive order, along with agency guidelines and regulations under the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which govern federal project
environmental review. Using the environmental justice doctrine as a tool
during project environmental review assures careful analysis of local or
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regional impacts on communities burdened by adverse social and economic
conditions.
Federal civil rights laws also support the doctrine,
notwithstanding recent U.S. Supreme Court civil rights decisions restricting
access to justice and consideration of race in employment testing.
California has followed the federal lead and has been a leading state in
adopting environmental justice statutes and policies. Thus, it is no surprise
that the Attorney General of California has sought to employ environmental
justice during the environmental review process.
California’s civil rights laws are stronger than federal civil rights
protections, and the state has endorsed environmental justice, both
generally and specifically, in its global warming regulatory regime. These
legal requirements support incorporating environmental justice when
applying the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), which is largely
modeled on NEPA. Environmental justice assures that the physical impacts
are properly understood in the socioeconomic context, and that cumulative
impacts, possible mitigation, and alternatives are properly assessed. Recent
California case law questioning CEQA’s application to projects situated near
hazards does not impact the fundamental role of environmental justice in
environmental review. The Attorney General is properly concerned with
projects that add to the burdens of vulnerable low-income communities or
communities of color.

I.

Introduction

The California Attorney General’s recent litigation involving
transportation planning and air pollutants (including global warming
emissions) affecting minority communities has sparked renewed interest in
the relationship between environmental review laws and the doctrine of
environmental justice. Environmental justice addresses disproportionate
environmental impacts on communities of color, low-income communities,
and other demographics that have historically faced discrimination.
California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris has actually intervened in two
cases challenging projects or programs for their failure to analyze
disproportionate impacts on minority communities.1 Some say the Attorney
General’s actions mark a “radical expansion” of the role of social justice in
environmental review.2

1. CEQA Litigation and Settlements, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://oag.ca.gov/environment/ceqa/
litigation-settlements (last visited June 8, 2012).
2. See Peter Hsiao, David Gold, Miles Imwalle & Jennifer Jeffers,
Environmental Justice as Environmental Impact: The Intersection of Environmental
Justice, Climate Change, and the California Environmental Quality Act, BlOOMBERG
BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, March 12, 2012, at 2.
42
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This article contends that the environmental justice doctrine does not
merely belong in project environmental review; rather it is essential to ensure
that environmental review fully captures the disproportionate effects of
environmental impacts on communities of color and low-income
communities. The Attorney General’s interest in environmental justice is a
return to well-founded principles of federal environmental analysis and civil
rights protection. As California is one of the state leaders in the adoption of
environmental justice policies, the Attorney General’s actions provide an
opportunity to evaluate the current vibrancy of legal environmental justice
doctrines in connection with project environmental review.
Federal law supports environmental justice analysis in the review of
projects seeking approval under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”). The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) also provides
ample authority for the use of environmental justice doctrines during
environmental review. Environmental justice groups have often cited
environmental justice concerns in regulatory proceedings involving the
review of projects on both the federal and state level.3
To be sure, there are federal and state court decisions, as well as
applicable regulations, that eschew social factors in certain circumstances
during environmental review. A line of California cases also seems to
question whether existing environmental hazards are even relevant to
projects that bring people into those conditions. And it is true that the
current United States Supreme Court majority seems more hostile than ever
toward attempts to address racial discrimination through the law. This
article suggests, however, that none of these cases should be construed to
mean that environmental justice is inappropriately brought into project
environmental review.
This article asserts that government agencies, community activists,
and others who are concerned with social justice should not hesitate to
assert that environmental review laws must address environmental justice.

3. E.g., In re: Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. & Shell Offshore, Inc., 2010 EPA
App. LEXIS 49 at *111 (EAB 2010); Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 6
E.A.DD. 66 (1995); In re: Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 6 E.A.D. 253
(EAB 1995). The author for many years directed the Environmental Law and
Justice Clinic at Golden Gate University School of Law where Title VI and,
more broadly, environmental justice issues were frequently asserted. See
Alan Ramo, Hunters Point: Energy Development Meets Environmental Justice, 5
ENVT’L L. NEWS 28 (Spring 1996) available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.
edu/pubs/128/ (discussing the California Energy Commission’s first
evidentiary hearings on environmental justice); Clifford Rechtschaffen,
Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: Some Lessons From the Legal and Organizing
Efforts of the Bayview-Hunters Point Community, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVT’L L. &
POL’Y 537 (Winter 2008).
43
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Section II analyzes the roots of the federal environmental justice doctrine
and its current requirements in light of recent federal civil rights cases.
Section III discusses California’s environmental justice requirements.
Section IV applies these California environmental justice requirements
specifically to CEQA. Section V then reviews the California Attorney
General’s litigation based upon these legal principles. Section VI concludes
that a proper understanding of environmental justice should be a key part of
project environmental review.

II.

Federal Environmental Justice Requirements
A. The Roots of the Federal Environmental Justice Doctrine

The doctrine of environmental justice originated in 1981 from a protest
led by civil rights activist Reverend Benjamin Chavis against the siting of a
polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”) hazardous waste site in a community of
color in North Carolina, during which Chavis first coined the term
“environmental racism.”4
The protest spurred the Washington DC
Congressional delegate, Walter Fauntroy, to ask the United States General
Accounting Office to examine toxic waste sites located in the Southeast
United States.5 This resulted in a report that showed that the sites were
disproportionately located near poor African-American communities.6
Finally, in 1992, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S.
EPA”) investigated and affirmed in its “Reducing Risk in All Communities”
report that the siting of waste sites was indeed related to race.7 Other
landmark studies reinforced the finding that race was an important
demographic predictor of exposure to hazardous sites, not merely a random
phenomenon, and that race was a more important factor than income.8 With

4. Dollie Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle:
Warren County Before and After, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 9, 24 (2007).
5. Id. at 26.
6. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING of
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES, (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1983); see Burwell & Cole, supra note 4, at 36-38.
7. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008,
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992).
8. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITES (1987). The study, using data on location of hazardous waste sites and
demographic data based upon zip codes, found that the percentage of
minority residents in communities containing these waste sites was twice as
44
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the aid of experts such as Robert Bullard,9 an activist movement asserting
the right of low income communities and communities of color to be free of
disproportionate risks from environmental hazards began to grow.10
That same year, Congressman John Lewis and then Senator Al Gore
introduced the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, the first legislative
attempt to codify the demands of the movement.11 The proposed law
required identification of “environmental high impact areas” (counties with
the most toxic hot spots) with a moratorium on additional siting of toxic
facilities until the areas were deemed to have met certain health standards.
In 1994, President Clinton issued an executive order and a presidential
memorandum that established environmental justice as a doctrine binding
federal agencies in their administration of federal laws.12
Implementing agencies began to issue various policy documents
explaining how they would apply the law. The Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) issued its own guidelines on how to integrate environmental
great as the percentage of minority residents in zip codes without such
facilities (24% versus 12%), and that the proportion of racial minorities in
communities containing two facilities or major landfills was three times
greater (38%). See Lena Williams, Race Bias Found in Location of Toxic Dumps,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1987, at A20; Bunay Bryant & Paul Mohai, Environmental
Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 163, 164, 169 (Bunay Bryant & Paul Mohai
eds., 1992); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN
UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 13-18 (1994).
For more recent data, see ROBERT D. BULLARD, PAUL MOHAI, ROBIN SAHA &
BEVERLY WRIGHT, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: WHY RACE STILL MATTERS
AFTER ALL OF THESE YEARS, 1978-2007 (2007); MANUEL PASTOR, JR., RACHEL
MORELLO-FROSCH, AND JAMES SADD, STILL TOXIC AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: AIR
QUALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA (2007).
9. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice: A New Framework for Action,
ENVTL. L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 16.
10. An excellent history of the Environmental Justice movement is
provided in LUKE W. COLE, SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT,
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS (2000).
11. H.R. 5326, 102d Cong. (2d Sess. 1992); S. 2806, 102d Cong. (2d
Sess. 1992); see Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting:
Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 353
(1995).
12. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994);
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 279 (Feb. 11,
1994).
45
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justice into NEPA.13 The EPA also provided a definition of environmental
justice for regulatory purposes, which focused on the concept of “fair
treatment”:
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national
origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies . . . . Fair treatment means that no
group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial,
governmental and commercial operations or policies[.]
Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an
opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may
affect their environment and/or health; (2) the public’s
contribution can influence the regulatory agency’s decision; (3)
their concerns will be considered in the decision making process;
and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the
involvement of those potentially affected[.]14
President Clinton’s Cover Memorandum for Executive Order 12898
made clear that Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and NEPA
would be integral to the discussion of environmental injustice:
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, each
Federal agency shall ensure that all programs or activities
receiving Federal financial assistance that affect human health or
the environment do not directly, or through contractual or other
arrangements, use criteria, methods, or practices that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.15
Executive Order 12898 required agencies to incorporate environmental
justice analysis into NEPA’s existing requirements – requirements such as
environmental assessments, environmental impact statements, and records
of decision.16

13. U.S. EPA, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (1998).
14. U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice/basics/index.html (last visited June 8, 2012).
15. See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, supra note 12.
16. Id.
46
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Title VI prohibits state agencies receiving federal financial assistance
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.17
Consequently, government agencies, including the EPA, developed
regulations prohibiting discrimination, for example, in the siting of projects
and the use of any criteria or methods in administering its program which
“have the effect” of subjecting individuals to discrimination on the grounds
of race, color, national origin, or sex.18 This is the so-called disparate
impacts test.19
These regulations are normally interpreted to prohibit disparate
impact unless a funding recipient can show a legitimate governmental
purpose for the disparate impact and the complainant is unable to show a
less discriminatory alternative for achieving that legitimate purpose.20 Title
VI provides that federal agencies must adopt regulatory procedures to allow
for private administrative complaints21 alleging violations of these
regulations against federal funding recipients to be adjudged by the federal
agencies, with the ultimate remedy being a loss of federal funding.22
Federal authority to address civil rights and environmental justice
derives from Congress’s authority to ban unconstitutional discrimination.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically
prohibits states from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”23 Further, the Constitution provides explicit
authority for Congress “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of [the Amendment].”24 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress
broad powers of enforcement.25 These powers include “the authority both to
remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth

17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
18. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b)-(c) (2012).
19. Id.
20. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403, 14 (11th Cir. 1985)
21. For an example of a recent Title VI administrative complaint, see
Alan Ramo, New Civil Rights Complaint Attacks California’s Greenhouse Gas Cap &
Trade Program as Racially Discriminatory, (June 12, 2012), http://ggucuel.org/newcivil-rights-complaint-attacks-california%E2%80%99s-greenhouse-gas-captrade-program-as-racially-discriminatory/6-8-12-cse-v-carb-title-vicomplaint-3.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
25. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982).
47
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Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”26
The exercise of presidential leadership and the new doctrine of
environmental justice led federal agencies to begin thinking about how to
incorporate environmental justice into environmental review. The Council
on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) and, ultimately, the EPA were the key
players in developing these policies because of their principal oversight role
in implementing NEPA.

B. Federal Environmental Justice Law and NEPA
Many federal environmental justice battles arise out of regulatory
proceedings for permits or the preparation of environmental impact
statements and reports.27 CEQ is charged with developing regulations to
control how federal agencies implement NEPA.28 In 1997, CEQ published
new guidance for how federal agencies should address environmental
justice.29 This guidance became the model for federal agencies to use in
addressing environmental justice.30
The EPA has broad authority to comment on any agency’s
environmental review documents.31 It followed CEQ with its own guidelines
on environmental justice in which it presented a number of examples of how
environmental justice may be brought into the project environmental review
process.32 The guidelines recognize that, due to unique cultural or

26. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) (citing Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)).
27. See In re: Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment
Center), 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998).
28. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 5, 1970).
29. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (Dec. 10, 1997).
30. E.g., U.S. N.R.C., ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDANCE FOR LICENSING
ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NMSS PROGRAMS (Aug. 22, 2003) & U.S. NRC,
PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR PREPARING ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND
CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (May 24, 2004), discussed in U.S. NRC,
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MATTERS IN
NRC REGULATORY AND LICENSING ACTIONS, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040, 52,041 (Aug. 24,
2004).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012).
32. See U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE
ANALYSES (Apr. 1998).
48
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socioeconomic challenges facing minority or low-income communities,
some cumulative impacts or resource utilization may not be apparent during
a typical scoping or screening of a project. As the EPA guidance states:
This includes subsistence living situations (e.g., subsistence
fishing, hunting, gathering, farming), diet, and other differential
patterns of consumption of natural resources. If a community is
reliant on consumption of natural resources, such as subsistence
fishing, an additional exposure pathway may be associated with
the community that is not relevant to the population at large.
Similarly, dietary practices within a community or ethnic group,
such as a diet low in certain vitamins and minerals, may increase
risk factors for that group.33
Due to historical zoning practices and an imbalance of power resulting
from poverty and racism, minority and low-income communities may face
multiple exposures to toxic hazards with few resources to mitigate these
exposures. The guidance recognizes the importance of these factors when
addressing cumulative impacts:
This includes such issues as whether affordable or free quality
health care is available and, whether any cultural barriers exist to
seeking health care.
Many low-income and/or minority
communities lack adequate levels and quality of health care,
often due to lack of resources or lack of access to health care
facilities . . . .
Other indirect effects which a low-income or minority population,
due to economic disadvantage, may not be able to avoid, that
will have a synergistic effect with other risk factors (e.g., vehicle
pollution, lead-based paint poisoning, existence of abandoned
toxic sites, dilapidated housing stock).34
Thus, the guidance calls for demographic analysis at the beginning of
project review. If vulnerable subpopulations will be exposed, “this should
trigger both an enhanced outreach effort to assure that low-income and
minority populations are engaged in public participation and analysis
designed to identify and assess the impacts. Also, a positive response to
this question should increase the team’s sensitivity to the potential for
cumulative impacts.”35

33.
34.
35.

Id. at Section 2.3, Exhibit 3.
Id.
Id. at Section 3.2.1.
49
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In theory, this approach is merely assuring a more thorough
environmental analysis. The guidance seems to denote, however, that
typical everyday analysis might overlook many of these factors. Thus,
demographic analysis is necessary to ensure that a more proper effort with
an appropriate level of sensitivity is conducted in order to root out what
should be determined, under conventional environmental review analysis, to
be significant impacts. The guidance states that their intent is to “heighten
awareness of EPA staff in addressing environmental justice issues within
NEPA analyses and considering the full potential for disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority populations
and low-income populations. . . .”36
The EPA has yet to finalize the specifics of what a demographic
analysis entails. Its draft guidance, explaining how states should conduct a
demographic analysis, remains no more than a draft more than twelve years
after work on it began. But the basics are clear in that states must:
(1) Identify the potentially impacted populations and determine their
race, ethnicity, and/or nationality;
(2) Compare the impacts on that population to other populations that
might have been affected by an alternative to the project;
(3) Examine other sources of impacts to determine if there are
additive, cumulative or synergistic impacts as a result of other projects and
their social and economic settings;
(4) Determine whether alone, or together with other impacts, the
project is having significantly adverse impacts on the subpopulation and
whether there are reasonable, less discriminatory, alternatives or potential
means of mitigation.37
Considering environmental justice during the environmental review
process enhances discussion over what defines a “significant impact,” as
well as the range of alternatives and mitigation methods. “Significance” is a
key factor in any environmental review. If an impact is significant and is not
mitigated, a full-blown Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) is required.
Federal regulations call the alternatives analysis in an EIS the heart of
environmental review.38 In other words, failure to identify a significant
impact that could have been identified through proper environmental
justice analysis would be a violation of NEPA and a potential civil rights
violation, as would the failure to consider a mitigation of that impact or an

36.
37.

Id. at Section 1.0.
See DRAFT TITLE VI GUIDANCE FOR EPA ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS
ADMINISTERING ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING PROGRAMS (DRAFT RECIPIENT
GUIDANCE) AND DRAFT REVISED GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (DRAFT REVISED INVESTIGATION
GUIDANCE), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27, 2000).
38. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012).
50
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alternative that would avoid that impact. Thus, the EPA Guidance calls for
more focused analyses when there are environmental justice concerns:
Environmental justice concerns may lead to more focused
analyses, identifying significant effects that may otherwise have
been diluted by examination of a larger population or area.
Environmental justice concerns should always trigger the serious
evaluation of alternatives as well as mitigation options.39
“Significance” is a vague term that depends upon the impact’s context
and intensity under federal law. “Context . . . means that the significance of
an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole
(human, national), the affected region, the affected interest, and the
locality.”40 CEQ explains:
Agency consideration of impacts on low-income populations,
minority populations, or Indian tribes may lead to the
identification of disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects that are significant and that
otherwise would be overlooked.41
Federal law requires that the alternatives analysis in an EIS should
provide a reasonable range of choices to address potential impacts and
achieve the project’s purposes.42 If the project raises environmental justice
concerns, the Guidance makes clear that in order to be considered
reasonable, a range of alternatives “should be drawn so as to allow an
assessment of the disproportionate nature of the effects, as well as the
magnitude of the effects, on the communities of concern.”43
Mitigation is the final essential element of a federal environmental
review analysis. It, too, must reflect environmental justice concerns: “In
addition, for each alternative that may result in potential environmental
justice concerns, mitigation measures aimed specifically at those impacts
should be identified and analyzed.”44
None of these requirements change NEPA’s fundamental proscription
on considering stand-alone economic or social impacts to be a basis for a

39. U.S. EPA, supra note 32, at Section 1.2.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (2012).
41. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 29, at 10.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2012).
43. U.S. EPA, supra note 32, at 3.2.5.
44. Id.
51
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significant impact finding that requires further environmental analysis.45 The
Supreme Court settled that question years ago.46 However, where those
economic or social impacts are interrelated, they must be examined:
When an environmental impact statement is prepared and
economic or social and natural or physical environmental effects
are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement will
discuss all of these effects on the human environment.47

C. Recent Federal Civil Rights Cases and Title VI’s Viability
While the above-described civil rights and environmental justice
policies remain in place, recent decisions addressing Title VI, coming
primarily out of the United States Supreme Court, must give one pause
about the full force and effect of Title VI as a tool for environmental justice.
However, none of these cases should affect the basic underlying doctrine of
environmental justice and its use during environmental review.
The Supreme Court has significantly narrowed an individuals’ ability
to protect their civil rights. Specifically, in Alexander v. Sandoval48 the Court
rejected the right of individuals to enforce Title VI’s administrative
regulations in court, instead requiring individuals to address all complaints
alleging disparate impacts directly to the agencies themselves under the
statute’s provisions for administrative complaint procedures, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (§ 602). The Court also clarified that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that bans discrimination by funding
recipients, only bans intentional discrimination as it reaches no further than
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause or the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause. 49 On that basis, while according to
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (2012) (“This means that economic or social
effects are not intended by themselves to require preparation of an
environmental impact statement.”).
46. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
778 (1983) (“If a harm does not have a sufficiently close connection to the
physical environment, NEPA does not apply.”). In an unpublished opinion,
the Fourth Circuit refused to set aside a decision to not require an EIS
merely upon a failure to consider disparate economic and social impacts “by
themselves”, after the Court found there was no Title VI violation. Goshen
Rd. Envtl. Action Team v. United States Dep’t of Agric., U.S. App. LEXIS 6135
(4th cir. 1999).
47. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1978); see Tongass Conservation Soc. v. Cheney,
924 F.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
48. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
49. Id. at 280-281.
52
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agency regulations individuals can still file administrative complaints to
agencies based upon a showing of disparate impact, they can only enforce
the statutory ban on discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d in court if they
can show intentional discrimination.50
Other courts have further constrained any attempt to bootstrap
administrative regulation enforcement in court through other civil rights
laws such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.51 Plaintiffs have thus found it difficult to
enforce Title VI in environmental justice cases.52
Sandoval did not prohibit agencies from enforcing their disparate
impact regulations themselves.
Currently, the Supreme Court has
“assumed” that administrative complaints alleging merely disparate impact
are permissible under 40 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, pursuant to agency regulations.53
Nor is there anything else in the decision that practically undermines the
relationship between social and economic factors and physical impacts that
would constrain a NEPA review.
In 2009, in Ricci v. Destefano54 in 2009, the Court raised the specter that it
would outright prohibit the use of explicit racial factors. There, the City of
New Haven used a test to promote firefighters that disparately impacted
African Americans’ results.55 The City, faced with threats from Whites and
Hispanics who were promoted, and from African Americans who were not,
decided to throw out the test. 56 As expected, because of this decision,
White and Hispanic firefighters sued.57 The Supreme Court found that the
City’s action, based upon the disparate impact alone, constituted
impermissible adverse disparate treatment towards Whites and Hispanics
on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58
As Title VII is often seen as a model for Title VI’s implementation,59 for
purposes of analyzing the role of environmental justice in environmental
review it is important to clarify what the Ricci Court did and what it did not
do. It did not prohibit the consideration of race when addressing disparate

50. Id.
51. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771 (2001).
52. Id.
53. Alexander v. Sandoval, supra note 48, at 281-282 (2001).
54. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
55. Id. at 579.
56. Id. at 557.
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e) et seq. (Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
59. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
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impact, nor did it declare unconstitutional a disparate impact test under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. Rather, the Court issued
a statutory interpretation of Title VII that explains how the disparate impact
test would work under these circumstances. A showing of disparate impact
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, unless
rebutted by a business necessity and with no showing by a plaintiff of a less
discriminatory alternative:
Under the disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie violation by showing that an employer uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). An employer may defend against
liability by demonstrating that the practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.
Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may
still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an
available alternative employment practice that has less disparate
impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs. 42 U.S.C.S.
§§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).60
This is the same test that was always thought to apply to Title VI
disparate impact claims.61 In this case, the Court simply made clear that the
motivation to avoid liability under this provision is not sufficient, as a
matter of law, to justify an action based upon race unless the City fails the
entire disparate impact test:
Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well intentioned or
benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its
employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test
results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.
The question is not whether that conduct was discriminatory but
whether the City had a lawful justification for its race-based
action.62
The City did not fail due to its consideration of race, but, rather, its
failure to develop a “strong-basis-in-evidence” showing that racial
disparities were not related to a legitimate governmental function or that
there was a less discriminatory alternative:

60. Ricci v. Destefano, supra note 54, at 578.
61. Bradford C. Mank, Proving an Environmental Justice Case: Determining
An Appropriate Comparison Population, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 388 (2001).
62. Ricci v. Destefano, supra note 54, at 579-80.
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Congress has imposed liability on employers for unintentional
discrimination in order to rid the workplace of “practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs, supra, at 431,
91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158. But it has also prohibited
employers from taking adverse employment actions “because of”
race. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard to Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in
the name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow
circumstances. The standard leaves ample room for employers’
voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory
scheme and to Congress’s efforts to eradicate workplace
discrimination. See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 515, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 92
L. Ed. 2d 405. And the standard appropriately constrains
employers’ discretion in making race-based decisions: It limits
that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in
evidence of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive
that it allows employers to act only when there is a provable,
actual violation.63
Thus, federal law, through Title VI, survives these decisions and
remains an important tool for environmental justice. Race or other
demographic considerations may be considered if necessary to carry out the
legitimate governmental purpose to avoid significant adverse environmental
impacts to vulnerable populations. Further, if those impacts are identified,
and not justified by a separate legitimate governmental purpose where there
are no less discriminatory alternatives, then these impacts must be
addressed or the action causing those impacts prohibited. Title VI, in
concert with environmental review under NEPA, should allow environmental
justice to be addressed with its focus on adverse physical impacts,
alternatives analysis, and mitigation.
There is reason for concern about the direction that the United States
Supreme Court is taking. Justice Scalia, one vote in the majority, warned:
I join the Court’s opinion in full, but write separately to observe that
its resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the
Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”64
Yet until that day comes, federal law continues to support the use of
racial and other demographic considerations to ensure environmental

63.
64.

Id. at 583.
Id. at 594.
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justice during environmental review. The analysis just has to be thorough
and properly done.
Thus, under NEPA, environmental justice affects every stage of
environmental review, from initial screening to the decision to require a full
EIS, and the actual contents of that EIS. Environmental justice, as the
interlinking of social and economic justice with physical environmental
impacts, is not merely an artificial grafting of social justice onto federal
environmental review policies. It is an essential tool for ensuring thorough
environmental review under challenging social circumstances consistent
with civil rights protections. CEQA, said by many state courts to be
modeled after NEPA, essentially requires the same analysis, as discussed
below.

III.

California Environmental Justice Requirements

California is a leading state in adopting the doctrine of environmental
justice. The California legislature explicitly adopted an environmental
justice statute that requires the California Environmental Protection Agency
(“Cal/EPA”) to “[c]onduct its programs, policies, and activities that
substantially affect human health or the environment in a manner that
ensures the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and income levels,
including minority populations and low-income populations of the state.”65
This definition of environmental justice is very similar to the federal EPA’s
definition.66 Further, the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research is
required to coordinate and consult with all of the state agencies’
environmental justice programs.67 Following the lines of Clinton’s Executive
Order, the legislation calls upon the agencies overseen by Cal/EPA to
include strategies to address environmental justice in their missions and
action plans.68
Further, California has created its own state equivalent of Title VI, and
then made it even broader while avoiding the pitfalls of Sandoval. California
outlaws discrimination based upon race, national origin, ethnic group
identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, genetic
information, and disability by the state or its agencies or any program

65. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71110(a) (Deering 2012).
66. See U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/environmen
taljustice/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (“Environmental Justice is the fair
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race,
color, national origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies.”).
67. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65040.12 (Deering 2012).
68. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71111 et seq. (Deering 2012).
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funded by the state.69 Administrative remedies do not preclude a private
right of action to enforce the statute, or the regulations implementing the
statute, and California law allows actions seeking equitable relief.70 The
regulations implementing the statute explicitly endorse the disparate
impact test prohibiting “. . .criteria or method of administration that (1) have
the purpose or effect of subjecting a person to discrimination . . . .”71 There
is an explicit prohibition on discriminatory sitings that “have the purpose or
effect of . . . subjecting them to discrimination . . . .”72
The impact of environmental justice has affected numerous other
policies, particularly those involving air pollution and, more recently,
climate change. A key environmental justice issue has been the problem of
toxic hot spots, that is, regions of exposure to multiple sources of toxic
chemicals primarily (although not exclusively) in urban core areas.73 In
response to demands from environmental organizations,74 the California
Legislature adopted the Air Toxics “Hot Spots” Information and Assessment
Act.75 The Legislature specifically commented on the problem of multiple
facilities, located close together, releasing toxic airborne chemicals:
These releases may create localized concentrations or air toxics
“hot spots” where emissions from specific sources may expose
individuals and population groups to elevated risks of adverse
health effects, including, but not limited to, cancer and
contribute to the cumulative health risks of emissions from other

69. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135 (Deering 2012).
70. Id. at § 11139 (Deering 2012); see Comm. Concerning Cmty.
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31022 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
30, 2004).
71. 22 C.C.R. § 98101(i) (2012).
72. Id. at § 98101(j)(1) (2012).
73. Helen H. Kang, Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and
Opportunities - Lessons from the Field, 31 Wash. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 123-125
(2009); Emily L. Dawson, Lessons Learned from Flint, Michigan: Managing Multiple
Source Pollution in Urban Communities, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
367, 395-397 (Winter 2001); Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice
Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 118-120
(1996).
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44301(a) (Deering 2012). In §
44301(a), the Legislature specifically declared it was responding to “recent
publicity surrounding planned and unplanned releases of toxic chemicals
into the atmosphere”, noting “the public has become increasingly concerned
about toxics in the air.”
75. Id. at § 44301 et seq. (Deering 2012).
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sources in the area. In some cases where large populations may
not be significantly affected by adverse health risks, individuals
may be exposed to significant risks.76
The statute requires local air districts to keep toxics emissions
inventories of sources of toxic air pollutants.77 On the basis of the
inventories, the local districts are required to focus upon the most severe
facilities, complete a risk assessment, and, if the risks are deemed too great,
acquire plans for reducing the risks to acceptable levels.78
The Legislature explicitly revisited environmental justice when
developing the landmark California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,
known as AB 32.79 The Act set forth the ambitious goal of reducing
California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.80 The
Legislature gave its California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) the flexibility to
design a plan using “direct emission reduction measures, alternative
compliance mechanisms, market-based compliance mechanisms, and
potential monetary and nonmonetary incentives for sources and categories
of sources . . . .”81
The potential (and now actual) use of market mechanisms causes real
concern among environmental justice advocates. They have raised many
questions, such as:
(1) Would market mechanisms concentrate emissions in urban
neighborhoods causing hot spots?82
(2) Would minority communities share in the benefits of any program
that auctions allowances in a trading program or would they share in the
same reduction of co-pollutants as other communities if trading were
allowed?83 After all, the state’s civil rights act speaks not only of

76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44301(d) (Deering 2012).
77. Id. at § 44340 et seq. (Deering 2012).
78. Id. at §§ 44360 et seq., 44390 et seq. (Deering 2012).
79. Id. at § 38500 et seq. (Deering 2012).
80. Id. at §§ 38550, 38561 (Deering 2012).
81. Id. at § 38561(b) (Deering 2012).
82. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury, et. al., Pollution Trading and
Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231 (Spring 1999); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean
Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, at n. 188 (2012).
83. See Luthien Niland, Cal. Cap-And-Trade Auction Money: Where Should It
Go?, CENTER ON URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Feb. 15, 2012), available at
http://ggucuel.org/cal-cap-and-trade-auction-money-where-should-it-go.
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“discrimination” but also of the denial of the “benefits” of a state program on
the basis of race.84
The California Legislature acknowledged these concerns and
reaffirmed environmental justice as an important doctrine in California
environmental law. The Legislature required that CARB, when adopting
regulations setting any emission limits and reduction measures, “[e]nsure
that activities undertaken to comply with the regulations do not
disproportionately impact low-income communities.”85 It further recognized
the concern over toxic hot spots and required that the regulations “[e]nsure
that activities undertaken pursuant to the regulations complement, and do
not interfere with, efforts to achieve and maintain federal and state ambient
air quality standards and to reduce toxic air contaminant emissions.”86
The Legislature similarly incorporated civil rights doctrines, requiring
that disadvantaged communities not be excluded from the benefits of state
programs:
The state board shall ensure that the greenhouse gas emission
reduction rules, regulations, programs, mechanisms, and
incentives under its jurisdiction, where applicable and to the
extent feasible, direct public and private investment toward the
most disadvantaged communities in California and provide an
opportunity for small businesses, schools, affordable housing
associations, and other community institutions to participate in
and benefit from statewide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.87
The Legislature understood the environmental justice concerns about
market mechanisms and, initially, there was open conflict over the use of
trading between the Governor and the Legislature.88 While it provided the
Governor with the option of utilizing market mechanisms, the Legislature, in
the very same provision, affirmed environmental justice principles:

84. CAL GOV’T CODE § 11135 (2012) (“No person . . . shall, on the basis of
race . . . be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of . . . any
program . . . .”).
85. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (Deering 2012).
86. Id. at § 38562(b)(4) (Deering 2012).
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (Deering 2012).
88. Mark Martin, Governor, Lawmakers Differ on Greenhouse Gas Measure;
Conflict Over How Industry Should Reduce Emissions, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Aug. 24, 2006, at A16.
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(a) The state board may include in the regulations adopted pursuant to
Section 38562 the use of market-based compliance mechanisms to comply
with the regulations.
(b) Prior to the inclusion of any market-based compliance mechanism
in the regulations, to the extent feasible and in furtherance of achieving the
statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit, the state board shall do all of the
following:
(1) Consider the potential for direct, indirect, and cumulative emission
impacts from these mechanisms, including localized impacts in
communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution.
(2) Design any market-based compliance mechanism to prevent any
increase in the emissions of toxic air contaminants or criteria air
pollutants.89
Recently, a California Court of Appeal implicitly affirmed the
importance of environmental justice analysis in the application of the state’s
global warming laws. In rejecting a challenge by an environmental justice
organization to a plan for implementing the laws, the court stated, “public
health and environmental justice were factors considered in connection with
each of the 11 measures analyzed for the agriculture sector.”90 Further, CARB
conducted a case study in the largely Hispanic Wilmington area of Los
Angeles to evaluate the potential environmental justice impacts of its
greenhouse gas reduction program:
Indeed, another of [plaintiffs’] criticisms is that ARB “made no
attempt to analyze potential disproportionate public health
impacts to communities living closest to the facilities eligible to
participate in the cap and trade system.” However, Wilmington,
the community chosen to assess local air quality impacts, the
plan points out, “includes a diverse range of stationary and
mobile emission sources, including the ports of Los Angeles and
Long Beach, railyards, major transportation corridors, refineries,
power plants, and other industrial and commercial operations.”91
Finally, the Legislature demonstrated its understanding that
environmental justice is not only a norm, a legal doctrine, and an insight
addressing environmental hazards to low-income communities and
communities of color, but also a process mandate. It explicitly included
environmental justice groups in the decision-making process. The Act92

89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570 (Deering 2012).
90. Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources
Board, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1505 (2012).
91. Id. at 39.
92. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.
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creates an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee, and the Committee is
specifically to be incorporated into the process, which will lead to a scoping
plan to design the program.93

IV.

California Environmental Justice Requirements’ Role in
CEQA Review

As discussed above, longstanding federal statutes and policies require
incorporation of environmental justice into environmental review at the
federal level. Further, federal civil rights laws require all state and local
agencies that receive federal assistance to incorporate the essential
elements of environmental justice into their programs. These requirements,
together with California’s statutory policies of incorporating environmental
justice into its environmental programs, lead to the conclusion that it
should be largely uncontroversial that environmental justice should be an
essential part of any analysis under CEQA. Yet, when California Attorney
General Kamala M. Harris in January 2012 intervened in a CEQA challenge
explicitly attacking a project’s failure to thoroughly analyze environmental
justice issues, at least one set of commentators questioned whether this
“would mark a radical expansion in the role played by CEQA from
environmental protection to social justice.”94
CEQA was originally drafted as a state version of NEPA, and California
courts consider NEPA cases to offer persuasive authority except where
statutory authority or case law require different conclusions.95 Given that
California already has parallel but more stringent civil rights laws, and that it
has taken bolder action by codifying environmental justice protections as
state policy, it is hard to understand how incorporating environmental
justice into CEQA analysis can be considered a radical expansion of CEQA,
especially in light of the federal government’s incorporation of
environmental justice concerns into NEPA.
Like NEPA, CEQA provides for an initial study to determine whether
there are potential significant environmental impacts that require a full
environmental review, or exceptions or possible mitigation that can
eliminate the need for a full Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) and
instead allow for a negative declaration, or a mitigated negative
declaration—the equivalent of the federal finding of No Significant Impact.96
Similar to a federal EIS, if a full EIR is conducted then the alternatives must

93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591 (Deering 2012).
94. Peter Hsiao et al., supra note 2, at 2.
95. Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 CA. 3d 190, 201 (1976).
96. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(c) (Deering 2012); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
14 (hereinafter “CEQA Guidelines”), §§ 15002(k2), 15063 (2012).
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be reviewed, significant impacts identified, and proposed mitigation of
those significant impacts must be discussed.97
A California EIR, like the federal EIS, is intended to be “an
informational document which will inform public agency decision makers
and the public generally of the significant environmental effect of a project,
identify possible ways to minimize the significant effects, and describe
reasonable alternatives to the project.”98 As the California Supreme Court
put it: “Its purpose is to inform the public and its responsible officials of the
environmental consequences of their decisions before they are made. Thus,
the EIR ‘protects not only the environment but also informed selfgovernment.’ “99
However, in an important departure from NEPA, CEQA is not merely
information-forcing. It requires that mitigation measures be deployed to
reduce impacts to insignificance when feasible. CEQA specifically prohibits
a project from being approved if it has significant impacts:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the state
that public agencies should not approve projects as proposed if
there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures
available which would substantially lessen the significant
environmental effects of such projects . . . .100
“Feasible” is defined in CEQA as “capable of being accomplished in a
successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account
economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.”101
The California Legislature foresaw that there may be circumstances
under which projects with unavoidable significant impacts (that is, those
where there is no available feasible means of mitigation) may need to move
forward: “The Legislature further finds and declares that in the event specific
economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible such project
alternatives or such mitigation measures, individual projects may be
approved in spite of one or more significant effects thereof.”102 However, the

97. CEQA Guidelines § 15121(a).
98. CEQA Guidelines § 15121(a); compare 40 CFR § 1502.1.
99. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal.3d 553, 564
(1990), quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of
California, 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (1988) (emphasis in original).
100. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (Deering 2012); See Mountain Lion
Foundation v. Fish & Game Comm., 16 Cal.4th 105, 134 (1997).
101. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.1 (Deering 2012) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at § 21002 (Deering 2012).
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Legislature required a new set of specific findings that address a broad array
of factors, including social concerns, in a final cost-benefit analysis:
[N]o public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which
an environmental impact report has been certified which
identifies one or more significant effects on the environment that
would occur if the project is approved or carried out unless both
of the following occur:
(a) The public agency makes one or more of the following
findings with respect to each significant effect:
. . . (3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other
considerations, including considerations for the provision of
employment opportunities for highly trained workers, make
infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified in
the environmental
impact report.
(b) With respect to significant effects which were subject to a
finding under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), the public agency
finds that specific overriding economic, legal, social,
technological, or other benefits of the project outweigh the
significant effects on the environment.103
Only if an agency issues a statement of overriding considerations, with
supporting findings and substantial evidence, may it approve a project with
significant impacts, and even then it must reasonably find that the benefits
of the project outweigh its costs or impacts.104
Thus, while some have stated correctly that CEQA does not mention
“environmental justice,”105 social factors play an important, and explicit, part
of the CEQA review process. The Legislature stated the intent of CEQA is in
part to “[c]reate and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony to fulfill the social and economic requirements
of present and future generations.”106
It is true that isolated social and economic impacts are not
“significant” impacts in the context of CEQA, just as they are not

103. Id. at § 21081 (Deering 2012) (emphasis added).
104. CEQA Guidelines §§ 15021(d), 15093(b).
105. Peter Hsiao et al., supra note 2, at 2.
106. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(e) (Deering 2012).
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“significant” under NEPA.107 However, the main thrust of environmental
justice is to recognize the relationship between social and economic factors,
on the one hand, and environmental impacts on the other hand. This
relationship, consistent with CEQA’s intent, is clearly covered under CEQA.
The statute and its implementing regulations, the CEQA Guidelines,108
make this coverage explicit. CEQA states: “Substantial evidence is not . . .
evidence of social or economic impacts that do not contribute to, or are not
caused by, physical impacts on the environment.109 This provision only
excludes social and economic factors unrelated to physical impacts on the
environment.
The CEQA Guidelines go on to say that economic or social impacts
that are related to physical impacts must be addressed:
Economic or social changes may be used, however, to determine
that a physical change shall be regarded as a significant effect on
the environment. Where a physical change is caused by
economic or social effects of a project, the physical change may
be regarded as a significant effect in the same manner as any
other physical change resulting from the project. Alternatively,
economic and social effects of a physical change may be used to
determine that the physical change is a significant effect on the
environment. If the physical change causes adverse economic or
social effects on people, those adverse effects may be used as a
factor in determining whether the physical change is
significant.110
The CEQA Guidelines further affirm the importance of social and
economic factors in determining significance, either as part of a causal chain
or as an exacerbating factor that makes a physical impact significant:
(a) Economic or social effects of a project shall not be treated as
significant effects on the environment. An EIR may trace a chain
of cause and effect from a proposed decision on a project
through anticipated economic or social changes resulting from
the project to physical changes caused in turn by the economic
or social changes. The intermediate economic or social changes

107. CEQA Guidelines § 15064(e).
108. The guidelines are proposed by the California Office of Planning
and Research and adopted by the California Resources Agency and codified
in the California Code of Regulations under Title 14 pursuant to CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21083 (Deering 2012).
109. Id. at § 2180(e) (Deering 2012); see Id. at § 2108.2 (Deering 2012).
110. CEQA Guidelines § 15064(e).
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need not be analyzed in any detail greater than necessary to trace
the chain of cause and effect. The focus of the analysis shall be
on the physical changes.
(b) Economic or social effects of a project may be used to
determine the significance of physical changes caused by the
project. For example, if the construction of a new freeway or rail
line divides an existing community, the construction would be
the physical change, but the social effect on the community
would be the basis for determining that the effect would be
significant. As an additional example, if the construction of a
road and the resulting increase in noise in an area disturbed
existing religious practices in the area, the disturbance of the
religious practices could be used to determine that the
construction and use of the road and the resulting noise would
be significant effects on the environment. The religious practices
would need to be analyzed only to the extent to show that the
increase in traffic and noise would conflict with the religious
practices. Where an EIR uses economic or social effects to
determine that a physical change is significant, the EIR shall
explain the reason for determining that the effect is significant.111
Thus, one California appellate court looking at a project that would
cause overcrowding in schools – and in turn the construction of a new
school – held that the physical impact due to social overcrowding was
significant.112 By contrast, another appellate court held that a project that
would cause some overcrowding in a school but would not lead to the
construction of a new school did not cause a significant impact.113 Thus,
when social impacts relate to physical impacts, they are well within CEQA’s
purview.
In spite of these explicit requirements to analyze the relationship
between socioeconomic factors and physical impacts, there is a developing
line of California cases that mark an important exception. These cases
essentially stand for the proposition that it is CEQA’s role to determine a
project’s impacts on the environment, not the environment’s impact upon a
project. Thus, a new school to be placed near freeways with a large amount

111. Id. at § 15131.
112. El Dorado Union High Sch. Dist. v. City of Placerville, 144 Cal.
App. 3d 123 (1983).
113. Goleta Union School Dist. v. Regents of University of California,
37 Cal. App. 4th 1025 (1995).
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of air emissions,114 or a zoning change allowing for residential development
near a source of odors,115 or placement of a residential facility for young
male drug and alcohol users near a contaminated site116 do not cause a
significant impact, even though they may attract people to these potentially
dangerous sites. However, this exception should not be exaggerated to
swallow up the fundamental rule.
In the most recent case along these lines, Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v.
City of Los Angeles,117 the Ballona Wetlands Land Trust and Ballona Ecosystem
Education Project challenged an environmental review of the second phase
of a new coastal master plan of a mixed retail/residential community. The
new community was not an environmental justice minority community nor
one associated with a concentration of toxic air emissions. The principle
objection was that the project, located about two miles from the coast,
might be inundated as a result of climate change that is anticipated to cause
sea levels to rise.118
The court understood this argument as another example of a project
allegedly putting people in harm’s way. It found this was not a
consideration under CEQA, holding that “[t]he purpose of an EIR is to
identify the significant effects of a project on the environment, not the
significant effects of the environment on the project.”119 The court
specifically limited CEQA Guideline section 15126.2, which states that an
“EIR should evaluate any potentially significant impacts of locating
development in other areas susceptible to hazardous conditions . . . .”120 The
court made the extent of its disapproval clear, however, in a footnote:
“Guidelines section 15126.2, subdivision (a) is consistent with CEQA only to
the extent that such impacts constitute impacts on the environment caused
by the development rather than impacts on the project caused by the
environment.”121

114. City of Long Beach v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 176 Cal.
App. 4th 889, 905 (2009).
115. South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point,
196 Cal. App. 4th 1604, 1614-18 (2011).
116. Baird v. County of Contra Costa, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1464, 1468
(1995).
117. Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal. App.
4th 455 (2011).
118. Id. at 472.
119. Id. at 473.
120. Id. at 474.
121. Id. at 474, n. 9. Ballona is a significant impact case and should not
be read as dismissing the need for an EIR to describe the setting of a
project. Indeed the Ballona court noted that the respondent City had after
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These cases involve problems that are very different from the problems
of clustering projects that contribute to toxic hot spots and perpetuate the
problem of disproportionate impacts for low-income communities or
communities of color, or the complete failure to analyze the impacts of a
new project on a vulnerable subpopulation that is already present near a
site. The heart of the environmental justice movement has not been an
attempt to keep housing or people out of low-income communities or
communities of color, which may be beset by disproportionate high risks
from toxics and other environmental threats, but rather to restore existing
communities to a healthy environment. As stated in the “Principles of
Environmental Justice,” one of the founding documents of the
environmental justice movement, “[e]nvironmental justice affirms the need
for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and
rural areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all our
communities, and providing fair access for all to the full range of
resources.”122
In theory, Ballona and its line of cases can be seen as limiting certain
environmental justice considerations under CEQA, to the extent that
challenges are made to zoning, programs, or projects that seek to channel
minorities into minority communities that are exposed to disproportionate
risks, thus perpetuating or exacerbating segregation and environmental
racism. Yet, to the extent that those decisions would be discriminating or
denying protected subpopulations the benefits of governmental programs,
they would be more appropriately addressed by state and federal civil rights
claims in any event.123 Meanwhile, these cases in no way affect the

criticism of the draft EIR provided a description of potential inundation from
rising seas due to climate change. 201 Cal. App. 4th at 476. An EIR may still
have to incorporate changes to a site resulting from climate change to set an
adequate baseline for evaluating impacts. See Neighbors for Smart Rail v.
Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority, 204 Cal. App. 4th 1480, 1491
(2012); Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond, 184 Cal.
App. 4th 70, 82 (2010) (stating “a complete description of a project has to
address not only the immediate environmental consequences of going
forward with the project, but also all ‘reasonably foreseeable consequence[s]
of the initial project.’ “).
122. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RESOURCE CENTER, Principles of Environmental
Justice, available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/princej.html (adopted on Oct. 27,
1991, in Washington D.C. at the People of Color Environmental Leadership
Summit).
123. E.g., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601
(outlawing discrimination in sale or rental of housing and other related
practices).
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predominant problem of environmental injustice which channels or sites
noxious projects into minority communities.
There are numerous cases affirming CEQA’s role in analyzing
cumulative impacts as described below which may be applied to projects
that create and expand toxic hot spots. A lead agency is required under
CEQA to assess whether a proposed project’s cumulative effect requires an
EIR.124 A project is deemed to have a significant effect on the environment if
the “possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumulatively
considerable.125 As one court put it:
Cumulative impact analysis is necessary because the full
environmental impact of a proposed project cannot be gauged in
a vacuum. One of the most important environmental lessons
that has been learned is that environmental damage often occurs
incrementally from a variety of small sources. These sources
appear insignificant when considered individually, but assume
threatening dimensions when considered collectively with other
sources with which they interact.126
This court’s description of cumulative impact analysis describes the
essence of what has been a chief concern of environmental justice activists
about toxic hot spots. In an urban area, individual sources may comply with
federal and state clean air laws, but their cumulative impact may cause
significant impacts. Evaluating that possibility fits exactly within CEQA’s
concept of cumulative impacts, and has for many years.
Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford127 is a foundational case
addressing the problem of air pollutant hot spots. The court quotes a law
review article by Dan Selmi that aptly describes this potential environmental
justice issue:
One of the most important environmental lessons evident from
past experience is that environmental damage often occurs
incrementally from a variety of small sources. These sources
appear insignificant, assuming threatening dimensions only
when considered in light of the other sources with which they
interact. Perhaps the best example is air pollution, where

124. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083(b) (Deering 2012); CEQA Guidelines §
15064(i)(1).
125. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083(b) (Deering 2012).
126. Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources
Agency, 103 Cal. App. 4th 98, 114 (2002).
127. 221 Cal. App. 3d 692 (1990).
68

West

Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2013

thousands of relatively small sources of pollution cause a serious
environmental health problem.
CEQA has responded to this problem of incremental
environmental degradation by requiring analysis of cumulative
impacts. Because of the critical nature of this concern, courts
have been receptive to claims that environmental documents
paid insufficient attention to cumulative impacts. For example, in
San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth, [San Franciscans for Reasonable
Growth v. City and County of San Francisco (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 61]
the court stated that absent meaningful cumulative analysis,
there would never be any awareness or control over the speed
and manner of downtown development. Without that control,
‘piecemeal development would inevitably cause havoc in virtually
every aspect of the urban environment.’
This judicial concern often is reinforced by the results of
cumulative environmental analysis; the outcome may appear
startling once the nature of the cumulative impact problem has
been grasped.128
On the basis of these principles, the Kings County Farm Bureau court
struck down an EIR for a power plant project that dismissed the significance
of its ozone emissions because it was a small part of a much worse problem.
The decision in Kings County Farm Bureau has been followed in other
cases. In Los Angeles Unified School District v. City of Los Angeles,129 the court
found that traffic noise from a project, while individually and incrementally
insignificant, would be cumulatively significant when combined with
existing sources of noise.130 The court specifically found that the setting, a
school, was an important consideration, providing another example of how
social factors can affect a determination of significance.131
In Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield,132 the court
disapproved of an EIR’s failure to discuss the development of two

128. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental Quality
Act 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 244, fn. omitted., (1984) (quoted in Kings County
Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, supra note 127, at 720-21).
129. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal.
App. 4th 1019 (1997).
130. Id. at 1025-26.
131. Id. at 1026; see CEQA Guidelines § 15064(b).
132. Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 124
Cal. App. 4th 1184 (2004).
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competing shopping centers together with all past, present and reasonably
anticipated future projects.133
A commonplace dismissal of environmental justice claims is that,
given the deteriorated conditions in which minority and low-income
communities often find themselves, these groups will not notice a project
that simply adds to the undesirability of the community’s environment. The
Bakersfield court was presented with a similar argument about the poor air
quality in the San Joaquin Valley, and stated: “The magnitude of the current
air quality problems in the San Joaquin Valley cannot be used to trivialize
the cumulative contributions of the shopping centers and the scope of the
analysis cannot be artificially limited to a restricted portion of the air
basin.”134 The court gave an example of a question the EIR should answer,
which has particular force in environmental justice cases: “Will combined
traffic cause an increase in mobile emissions that adversely affects sensitive
receptors?”
The Bakersfield court also affirmed the line of California cases that
approved CEQA Guidelines section 15064’s recognition that an indirect
effect that includes social and economic causes but culminates in physical
impacts may be a significant impact that requires environmental analysis.135
In reviewing a proposed Wal-Mart anchored shopping center, the court held:
“[W]hen there is evidence suggesting that the economic and social effects
caused by the proposed shopping center ultimately could result in urban
decay or deterioration, then the lead agency is obligated to assess this
indirect impact.”136
The application of this urban decay case to environmental justice
cases is clear. Where a project exacerbates the disparities between people
of different race, income or other social factors contributing to physical
impacts in the community, that is the kind of impact that must be analyzed
under CEQA. This applies whether direct pollution impacts affect a
vulnerable community exposed to other sources of pollution, or whether it
causes an overall deterioration and decay in the physical attributes of a
community.
CEQA, as an information-forcing environmental review statute, also
provides process protections that are critical to environmental justice.
According to the CEQA Guidelines:
EIRs and negative declarations should be prepared as early as
feasible in the planning process to enable environmental
considerations to influence project program and design and yet

133.
134.
135.
136.
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Id. at 1205-1206.
Id. at 1207.
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late enough to provide meaningful information for environmental
assessment.137
The Guidelines specifically recommend an early scoping process, and
provides that “the Lead Agency may also consult directly with any person or
organization it believes will be concerned with the environmental effects of
the project.”138
The CEQA statute provides that documents should be user-friendly for
the public, and environmental justice advocates have successfully argued
that the documents should be printed in the primary language of the
population affected.139 The statute requires: “Documents prepared pursuant
to this division be organized and written in a manner that will be meaningful
and useful to decision makers and to the public.”140 The CEQA Guidelines
require that “EIRs shall be written in plain language and may use
appropriate graphics so that decision makers and the public can rapidly
understand the documents.”141 And the documents should be timely:
Information relevant to the significant effects of a project,
alternatives, and mitigation measures which substantially reduce
the effects shall be made available as soon as possible by lead
agencies, other public agencies, and interested persons and
organizations.142
CEQA’s process requirements represent a powerful tool for
environmental justice advocates:
[N]oncompliance with the information disclosure provisions of
this division which precludes relevant information from being
presented to the public agency . . . may constitute a prejudicial
abuse of discretion . . . regardless of whether a different outcome
would have resulted if the public agency had complied with
those provisions.143

137. CEQA Guidelines § 15004.
138. Id. at § 15083.
139. El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, No.
366045, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 20357 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Dec. 30,
1991).
140. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003(b) (Deering 2012).
141. CEQA Guidelines § 15140.
142. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003.1(b) (Deering 2012).
143. Id. at § 21005(a) (Deering 2012).
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For example, the failure to abide by these process requirements
temporarily halted California’s global warming trading regime. In Association
of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board,144 the plaintiffs successfully
argued that CARB, the lead agency for California’s climate change program,
failed to adequately analyze alternatives to its Cap-And-Trade strategy, and
it jumped the gun by approving the plan before the staff completed their
responses to comments on their CEQA environmental analysis. The
California Superior Court in San Francisco issued a writ requiring CARB to
reconsider the plan, and to respond to comments. The court quoted the
California Supreme Court’s affirmation of the public process:
The written response requirement ensures that members of the
Commission will fully consider the information necessary to
render decisions that intelligently take into account the
environmental consequences . . . . It also promotes the policy of
citizen input underlying CEQA . . . . When the written responses
are prepared and issued after a decision has been made,
however, the purpose served by such a requirement cannot be
achieved.”145
CARB eventually redid its alternatives analysis, considered responses to old
and new comments before making its decision, and has now begun the
implementation of its plan, albeit delayed a year.146
It is therefore incorrect to say that “social justice” is separate from
CEQA, that CEQA does not consider social factors, or that environmental
justice has no place in the CEQA context. Environmental justice represents
an insight into the relationship between social and economic factors on the
one hand, and actual environmental impacts on people and their
communities on the other. Environmental justice encapsulates this link
between people and the way they treat each other and their environment.
Thus, consideration of race and broader demographics of a potentially

144. Associated of Irritated Residents et al. v. California Air Resources
Board et al., No. CPF-09-509562, (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County,
March 18, 2011), available at http://ggucuel.org/update-sf-court-affirms-tenta
tive-ceqa-ruling-on-ab-32.
145. Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Comm., 16 Cal. 4th
105, 133 (1997).
146. See Alan Ramo, Update: SF Court Affirms Tentative CEQA Ruling on AB
32, GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW BLOG (MAR. 23, 2011), http://ggucuel.org/update-sf-court-affirms-tenta
tive-ceqa-ruling-on-ab-32 (blog for discussion of the progress of the case
and the judge’s decision).
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impacted community is crucial to a proper, thorough, and sensitive
environmental review.

V.

The California Attorney General’s Intervention in
Environmental Justice Cases

It is this regulatory backdrop, that CEQA is directly related to
environmental justice, which allows for a proper analysis of the California
Attorney General’s assertion regarding the State’s environmental justice
concerns. State law provides that the “Attorney General shall be permitted
to intervene in any judicial or administrative proceeding in which facts are
alleged concerning pollution or adverse environmental effects which could
affect the public generally.”147 The Attorney General is required to be
informed of any case being brought under CEQA.148
Given this authority, in September 2011, the California Attorney
General first intervened through a challenge by the Center for Community
Action and Environmental Justice to an industrial development next to a
primarily Hispanic and low-income residential community in Riverside
County, California. The Attorney General alleged that the project’s addition
of 1,500 diesel truck trips per day would exacerbate “disproportionate
impacts on the people living . . . near the Project area, who already suffer
from substantial exposure to toxic air contaminants.”149
In an even more intriguing case, in January 2012, the Attorney General
petitioned to intervene in the case of Cleveland National Forest Foundation and
Center for Biologic Diversity v. San Diego Association of Governments, et al.150 The case
is a challenge to San Diego County’s most recent Regional Transportation
Plan (“RTP”) adopted pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act and state law

147. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12606 (Deering 2012).
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 388 (Deering 2012); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21167.7 (Deering 2012).
149. People’s Compl. in Intervention and Pet. for Writ of Mandate at 4,
para. 12, Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v. County
of Riverside et al., Cal. Superior Court of Riverside County, No. RIC 1112063
(Sept. 6, 2011), available at oag.ca.gov/environment/ceqa/litigation-settl
ements/.
150. People of the State of California’s Pet. for Writ of Mandate in
Intervention (hereinafter “People’s Pet.”), Cleveland National Forest
Foundation and Center for Biologic Diversity v. San Diego Association of
Governments, et al. Cal. Superior Court of San Diego County, No. 37-201100101593-CU-TT-CTL (Jan. 20, 2012), available at oag.ca.gov/environment/
ceqa/litigation-settlements.
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provisions for funding transportation related projects.151 Interestingly, this
plan was the first in California to include a section addressing California’s
SB 375, the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008.152
As its name implies, the Act requires metropolitan planning organizations to
develop regional greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for passenger
vehicles and to develop a Sustainable Community Strategy (“SCS”) for
attaining these targets through integrated land use, housing and
transportation planning. The Act further requires the strategy is to be
incorporated into the federally enforceable Regional Transportation Plan
(“RTP”) and subsequently forming the Regional Transportation
Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (“RTP/SCS”).
In a nutshell, the Attorney General and the plaintiffs argued that the
Plan emphasizes traditional freeway projects more than it should, and fails
to direct sufficient funding to projects such as mass transit that would
reduce air pollution.153 This, in turn, impacts air quality in several
communities already bearing disproportionate air pollution impacts and
interfering with California’s goal of reducing greenhouse gases:
[T]he People challenge the EIR’s adequacy as to the
environmental harm that may result from the project’s emphasis
on freeway and highway expansion and extension, to the
detriment of public transportation and air quality, its adequacy
and accuracy in analyzing and disclosing the air quality impacts
of the RTP/SCS, especially the impacts on communities that are
already overburdened by pollution, and the project’s failure to
achieve long-term and sustainable reductions/in greenhouse gas
emissions.154
Peter Hsaio and his co-authors argue, “the attorney general has taken
an aggressive position that EJ impacts must be addressed under CEQA.”155
They point out that CEQA does not use the words “environmental justice,”
that no court has required a disparate impacts analysis under CEQA, and
that environmental documents generally do not provide that analysis.156
As discussed above, however, the elements underlying environmental
justice analysis have long been included under CEQA case law, statute, and

151. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66508-66518 (Deering
2012).
152. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 14522.1 et seq., § 65080(b)(2) (Deering 2012).
153. People’s Pet., supra note 150, at p. 7, para. 18.
154. Id.
155. Hsaio et al, supra note 2, at 3.
156. Id.
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guidelines, as well as NEPA (CEQA’s regulatory model). Further, there is
nothing shocking about allegations challenging freeway oriented
transportation programs that disfavor mass transit, as similar cases have
been brought before.157 Indeed, previous federal cases have alleged that
transportation agencies’ funding had violated civil rights laws by
discriminating against urban core bus transit.158
Hsiao and his co-authors also fail to note that the issue in the San
Diego case159 is not whether there should be a Title VI environmental justice
or disparate impact analysis. San Diego did such analysis, but allegedly
stopped at the point where it would connect that analysis with air pollution
from mobile sources using expanded freeways.
All that seems to be new is the California Attorney General’s explicit
argument that the failure to analyze such potential disparate impacts on
vulnerable subpopulations raises CEQA concerns:
[The FEIR] [d]oes not perform an adequate analysis to determine
whether the health impacts of exposure to increased particulate
matter emissions will be more severe for low-income or minority
communities that already suffer from disproportionate health
burdens from existing levels of localized air pollution.160
The complaint refers to “the adverse effect of the project on the
environment experienced by communities that already are overburdened by
pollution . . . .”161 It notes that San Diego has the seventh worst ozone
problem in the nation.162 It specifies that particulate air pollution creates a
risk of 480 excess cases of cancer per million (San Diego’s population is 3.2
million), and that much of the particulates are from car and truck traffic on
the region’s freeways and highways.163 And, not surprisingly, it alleges that
the Final EIR (“FEIR”) failed to focus upon how “the most vulnerable people

157. E.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. Deukmejian, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17976; 34 ERC (BNA) 1592 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“Plaintiffs assert
that ‘freeway happy’ MTC continues to ignore the mandate of the Clean Air
Act in its relentless pursuit of highway expansion as the primary solution to
problems of congestion and pollution.”).
158. Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir.
2011); Labor/Community Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth.,
263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001).
159. People’s Pet., supra note 150.
160. Id. at para. 22(d).
161. Id. at para. 1.
162. Id.
163. Id. at para. 2.
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in the region will be affected (e.g., those living directly adjacent to freeways
and highways), or how residents’ risk of developing cancer will increase
based on emissions from the RTP/SCS’s freeway and highway projects.”164
The complaint refers to and incorporates the Attorney General’s
comments submitted during the review process as described below. These
comments are more explicit with regard to San Diego’s alleged failure to
address the problem of disproportionate impacts to vulnerable
subpopulations:
The harm from these pollutants is not necessarily distributed
equally throughout the region, but may be more concentrated in
communities immediately adjacent to large-scale industrial and
commercial development and major transportation corridors,
and may more particularly affect certain segments of the
population. As discussed below, our review of the DEIR
indicates that SANDAG has set too low a bar for determining
whether the air quality impacts of its RTP/SCS are significant, and
further, has failed to analyze the impacts of projected increases
in pollution on communities are sensitive or already
overburdened with pollution, in violation of CEQA.165
The Attorney General’s comments are consistent with the classic
definition of a community vulnerable to environmental justice. The Attorney
General’s comments cite to the Kings County Farm Bureau case, quoting that
“[t]he significance of an activity depends upon the setting.”166
Ironically, as noted in the Attorney General’s comments, San Diego
included a chapter in its Draft EIR (“DEIR”), and eventually its FEIR, entitled
“Social Equity: Title VI and Environmental Justice.”167 The chapter appears to
document a very thorough environmental justice process. However, as the
Attorney General spotted when commenting upon the DEIR, it has a “lack of
any discussion of the impacts of the increased air pollution that will result
from carrying out the RTP/SCS on communities already severely impacted by
air pollution.”168 Instead, it focuses strictly upon providing “an equitable
level of transportation services for all populations.”169

164. Id. at para. 4.
165. Id. at Exhibit I, p. 2.
166. Id., quoting Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, supra at
note 127, at 718.
167. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS, 2050 REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION PLAN, Ch. 4 (Oct. 28, 2011).
168. People’s Pet., supra note 150, Exhibit I, p. 4
169. 2050 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN, supra note 167, at 4-4.
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Providing equal access to transportation is indeed a worthwhile
environmental justice goal. The chapter appears to document a thorough
demographic analysis of what it calls a majority minority county, and the
relationship of subpopulations to access for housing, jobs, services and
recreation. Yet the entire section on public health is focused upon
encouraging access to transportation to address mobility issues for the
disabled and elderly, and obesity. There is no discussion of air pollution in
relation to overburdened communities in the public health section.170
The Attorney General’s comments correctly spell out what a CEQA
analysis requires to properly address environmental justice:
CEQA requires that the significance of environmental impacts be
considered in context. (Kings County Farm Bureau, supra, 221
Cal.App.3d at 718) Such context may appropriately include (1)
whether the region includes communities or subpopulations that
may be particularly sensitive to increases in pollution; and (2)
whether such communities or groups are already at or near their
capacity to bear any additional pollution burden.171
The Attorney General’s complaint is silent as to what may make
communities overburdened, and how social factors may be involved. But
the incorporated comments clearly demonstrate how the essence of
environmental justice’s concerns with demographic factors relate to physical
significant impacts upon people:
“[A] number of studies have reported increased sensitivity to
pollution, for communities with low income levels, low education
levels, and other biological and social factors. This combination
of multiple pollutants and increased sensitivity in these
communities can result in a higher cumulative pollution impact.”
(Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, Cumulative
Impacts: Building a Scientific Foundation (Dec. 2010), Exec. Summary
at p. ix.). [Available at http://oehha.ca.gov/ej/cipa123110.html]
Research in other parts of California has shown that
disadvantaged and minority communities are often exposed to
unhealthful air more frequently and at higher levels than other

170. Id. at 4-63. The author is not intending to comment upon the
entire document or its legal sufficiency but it is striking that the
Environmental Justice section failed to explicitly address freeway auto and
truck pollution issues.
171. People’s Pet., supra note 150, Exhibit I, p. 4.
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groups. [footnote omitted] Identifying these communities is an
essential part of describing the relevant CEQA setting.172
Why does race matter? Is this merely an appeal to social justice? The
Attorney General correctly points out that race, income, and other social
factors may show that lurking in communities demarcated by these social
factors are multiple and hidden sources of pollution or other factors that
make additional pollution more significant with regard to public health.
Presumably, this can be attributed to historical or current social and
economic dynamics in our society. This concern is well supported by
available data, as previously described, and it is now formally recognized in
state government and academia. Recently, California’s Office of Health
Hazard Assessment released guidelines for addressing cumulative impacts
in the context of related social conditions:
Cal/EPA’s screening methodology . . . starts with an understanding of which individuals, or groups of people, may be more
sensitive to additional exposures. By considering social factors
such as educational level, economic factors such as income level,
and other factors, Cal/EPA can develop a more complete picture
of the cumulative impacts on communities.173
The University of California at Davis recently used this approach to analyze a
low-income community in Fresno, California.174
This approach to CEQA is nothing more than what CEQA already
addresses in requiring an adequate analysis of the environmental setting, an
essential topic of all EIRs.175 As the Third District Court of Appeal has
explained, “[b]efore the impacts of a project can be assessed and mitigation

172. People’s Pet., supra note 150, Exhibit I at 4. For a summary of the
attorney general’s position on CEQA and environmental justice, see
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ENVIRONMENAL JUSTICE AT THE LOCAL AND
REGIONAL LEVEL, LEGAL BACKGROUND (JULY 10, 2012), available at http://oag.ca.
gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/environment/ej_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2012).
173. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS:
BUILDING A SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION (Dec. 2010), available at http://oehha.ca.
gov/ej/pdf/CIReport123110.pdf.
174. UC DAVIS, CTR. FOR REG’L CHANGE, LAND OF RISK, LAND OF
OPPORTUNITY, CUMULATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITIES IN CALIFORNIA’S SAN
JOAQUIN VALLEY (Nov. 2011), available at http://regionalchange.ucdavis.edu/
publications/Report_Land_of_Risk_Land_of_Opportunity.pdf.
175. CEQA Guidelines § 15125(a).
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measures considered, an EIR must describe the existing environment. It is
only against this baseline that any significant environmental effects can be
determined.”176 Thus, a failure to identify all present pollutants and other
stresses impacting a community would prevent an adequate measurement
of the significance of additional sources of pollution.
The Attorney General’s comments extend this analysis to the
greenhouse gases that are released by automobiles and trucks. The
comments do not merely argue in favor of social justice, they point out the
relationship between social factors and the implications of the physical
effects of the proposed project:
The burdens of climate change will not be shared equally. Future
climate scenarios are expected to disproportionately affect, for
example, the urban poor, the elderly and children, traditional
societies, agricultural workers and rural populations.177
This argument is consistent with other studies establishing that the
effects of climate change could potentially cause disparate impacts to lowincome communities in the United States.178
Whether the Attorney General is right about the specific facts of this
case depends upon what the record will show, and is subsequently beyond
the reach of this article.179 The point to emphasize is that the Attorney
General’s arguments, on their face, are well within CEQA authority and are
consistent with the federal approach to environmental justice and
environmental project review. The issue is not whether social injustice is a

176. County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 76 Cal.
App. 4th 931, 952 (1999).
177. People’s Pet., supra note 150, at Ex. I, p. 7 (citing CALIFORNIA’S
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IMPACTS (Dec. 2010) at p. 2.,
available at http://oehha.ca.gov/multimedia/epic/epic123110.html).
178. E.g. MANUEL PASTOR, RACHEL MORELLO FROSCH, JAMES SADD & JUSTIN
SCOGGINS, MINDING THE CLIMATE GAP, USC Program for Environmental and
Regional Equity (2010), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/
mindingthegap.pdf; RACHEL MORELLO FROSCH, MANUEL PASTOR, JIM SADD, AND
SETH SHONKOFF, THE CLIMATE GAP: INEQUALITIES IN HOW CLIMATE CHANGE HURTS
AMERICANS AND HOW TO CLOSE THE GAP, USC PROGRAM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND
REGIONAL EQUITY (2009), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/publications/
ClimateGapReport_full_report_web.pdf.
179. The California Attorney General was allowed to intervene and, as
of Oct. 8, 2012 the case is still pending. STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://oag.ca.gov/environment/ceqa/
litigation-settlements (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
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matter for CEQA review. The Attorney General correctly points out that if
this project increases air pollutants, including particulates and greenhouse
gases, then the significance of those impacts on human beings are best
understood by understanding the demographics of the population and the
constellation of other sources or stresses that may make those populations
particularly vulnerable.180 The failure to do this analysis, if true, would
according to the analysis of this article violate CEQA requirements for
properly analyzing the impacts from the project.

VI.

Conclusion

Environmental justice is now an established doctrine of federal
administrative law that has survived multiple presidential administrations.
It is rooted in federal constitutional and statutory civil rights protections. It
allows for a more in-depth and sensitive application of NEPA to more fully
capture the potential adverse significant impacts, alternatives, and
mitigation methods that would protect communities of color, low-income
communities, and other communities whose social demographics lead to
increased exposure to pollutants and serious disparate impacts.
California has been a leader among the states in applying this doctrine
to state law as a matter of policy and administrative practice. Not
surprisingly, the California Attorney General is seeking to apply this law in
the State’s environmental review processes. Even though critics may
consider this application to be a radical social justice experiment, the
Attorney General is acting well within state law and the federal approach in
articulating the importance of environmental justice concerns when
implementing CEQA.

180.
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See, supra note 176, 177.

